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Before: McKEE, Chief Judge, SMITH, and HARDIMAN, Circuit Judges 
 
 
(Filed: March 10, 2016)       
                        
_____________________ 
 
  OPINION 
_____________________               
                
SMITH, Circuit Judge.  
 
 This case comes to us on appeal from the District Court’s denial of Checker 
Cab’s1 motion for a preliminary injunction.  Checker Cab alleged that Uber2 was 
violating Pennsylvania’s unfair competition law and sought an injunction to prevent Uber 
from operating in Philadelphia until the underlying lawsuit was resolved.  The District 
Court denied this motion because Checker Cab failed to show irreparable harm.  We hold 
that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in so concluding, and therefore will 
affirm. 
I. 
 Checker Cab sued Uber in the United States District Court for the Eastern District 
of Pennsylvania, alleging (1) violations of Pennsylvania unfair competition laws, (2) false 
advertising under the Lanham Act, and (3) several violations of the federal Racketeer 
                                                 
 This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
1 Plaintiffs consist of 45 taxicab companies and a taxicab dispatch company who provide 
taxi services in Philadelphia (collectively, “Checker Cab”). 
2 Defendants consist of Uber Technologies, Inc., several of Uber’s officers, two of Uber’s 
wholly-owned subsidiaries, various investors, and a number of drivers who used Uber 
Technologies, Inc. to provide transportation services in Philadelphia (collectively, 
“Uber”). 
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Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act.  As Checker Cab makes clear, “[t]he 
gravamen of [its] Complaint is that the Uber defendants are operating an illegal gypsy 
cab operation in the City of Philadelphia in violation of law and regulation.”  
Accordingly, Checker Cab alleges that it is “being harmed daily by [Uber’s] illegal gypsy 
operation” because “Uber is taking away customers from the medallion cabs” and is thus 
causing “damage to their business, reputation, and goodwill.” 
 Checker Cab then filed a motion for a preliminary injunction against Uber.  This 
motion was based solely on Uber’s alleged violation of Pennsylvania unfair competition 
laws and asserted only one irreparable harm: the loss of customers by medallion cabs 
resulting from Uber’s operations in Philadelphia.  This motion was denied by the District 
Court for failure to show (1) a likelihood of success on the merits and (2) irreparable 
harm.  Checker Cab then filed a motion to vacate and reconsider.  This was denied for 
failure to raise any arguments implicating the “narrowly-prescribed circumstances 
necessary for reconsideration.”  Checker Cab then appealed the District Court’s order 
denying its preliminary injunction, but did not appeal the motion to reconsider. 
II. 3 
 “We review the District Court’s decision to grant or deny a preliminary injunction 
for abuse of discretion.  The district court’s findings of fact are reviewed for clear error 
and its conclusions of law are subject to plenary review.”  Ferring Pharm., Inc. v. Watson 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
3 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1367; we have 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1). 
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Pharm., Inc., 765 F.3d 205, 210 (3d Cir. 2014) (citation omitted).  Preliminary injunctive 
relief is an “extraordinary remedy, which should be granted only in limited 
circumstances.”  Novartis Consumer Health, Inc. v. Johnson & Johnson-Merck 
Consumer Pharm. Co., 290 F.3d 578, 586 (3d Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks and 
citations omitted).  “A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that he is 
likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence 
of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is 
in the public interest.”  Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008).  The 
“failure to establish any element . . . renders a preliminary injunction inappropriate.”  
NutraSweet Co. v. Vit-Mar Enters., Inc., 176 F.3d 151, 153 (3d Cir. 1999).  The movant 
bears the burden of showing that these four factors weigh in favor of granting the 
injunction.  Opticians Ass’n of Am. v. Indep. Opticians of Am., 920 F.2d 187, 192 (3d Cir. 
1990). 
III. 
 We thus turn to Checker Cab’s claim that the District Court erred in concluding 
that Checker Cab failed to allege an irreparable harm.  As we held in Campbell Soup Co. 
v. ConAgra, “[t]he law . . . is clear in this Circuit: In order to demonstrate irreparable 
harm the plaintiff must demonstrate potential harm which cannot be redressed by a legal 
or an equitable remedy following a trial.  The preliminary injunction must be the only 
way of protecting the plaintiff from harm.”  977 F.2d 86, 91 (3d Cir. 1992) (internal 
quotation marks and citations omitted).  Additionally, “[t]he ‘requisite feared injury or 
harm must be irreparable—not merely serious or substantial,’ and it ‘must be of a 
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peculiar nature, so that compensation in money cannot atone for it.’”  Id. at 91-92 
(quoting ECRI v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 809 F.2d 223, 226 (3d Cir. 1987)).  Indeed, as we 
have also recognized, “[t]his is not an easy burden.”  Adams v. Freedom Forge Corp., 
204 F.3d 475, 485 (3d Cir. 2000).  Plaintiff must “demonstrate[] a significant risk that he 
or she will experience harm that cannot adequately be compensated after the fact by 
monetary damages.”  Id. at 484-85.  Accordingly, it is clear that this Court has “long held 
that an injury measured in solely monetary terms cannot constitute irreparable harm.”  
Liberty Lincoln-Mercury, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 562 F.3d 553, 557 (3d Cir. 2009). 
 Checker Cab fails to carry this heavy burden.  The only harm Checker Cab alleges 
in its motion for a preliminary injunction is the loss of customers: “irreparable harm can 
be shown by the fact that Uber is taking away customers from the medallion cabs, a harm 
that can be shown but not quantified—the definition of irreparable harm.”  This, 
however, is a purely economic harm that can be adequately compensated with a monetary 
award following adjudication on the merits.  In re Arthur Treacher’s Franchisee Litig., 
689 F.2d 1137, 1145 (3d Cir. 1982) (“[W]e have never upheld an injunction where the 
claimed injury constituted a loss of money, a loss capable of recoupment in a proper 
action at law.”). 
 Checker Cab raises additional allegations4 of irreparable harm in its motion to 
reconsider and on appeal, but these arguments are forfeited.  They were not raised in 
                                                 
4 Checker Cab claims that “[w]hile it is true that Defendants are ‘stealing’ fares from 
Plaintiffs, the most dire consequence of Defendants’ unfair business practices is that 
certain of the [Plaintiffs] may soon lose their businesses and possibly their homes.”  
While we conclude that this argument is forfeited, we also have doubts about its viability 
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Checker Cab’s motion for a preliminary injunction and there are no grounds for granting 
a good cause exception.5  See Macfarlan v. Ivy Hill SNF, LLC, 675 F.3d 266, 269 (3d Cir. 
2012) (“[W]e sua sponte have the obligation of considering and confining an appellant to 
the issue which he has chosen to appeal.”); Elfman Motors, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 567 
F.2d 1252, 1254 (3d Cir. 1977) (“When an appeal is taken from a specified judgment 
only or from a part of a specified judgment, the court of appeals acquires thereby no 
jurisdiction to review other judgments or portions thereof not so specified or otherwise 
fairly to be inferred from the notice.”). 
 Accordingly, we conclude that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in 
denying Checker Cab’s motion for a preliminary injunction.6 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
for the reasons articulated by the District Court in its denial of Checker Cab’s motion for 
reconsideration. 
5 To the extent that there is any confusion among the parties, we note that the Notice of 
Appeal only covered the District Court’s denial of Checker Cab’s preliminary injunction 
motion and did not cover the subsequent motion to reconsider. 
6 Because Checker Cab’s motion fails to allege an irreparable harm, there is no need to 
reach the second ground on which the District Court dismissed Checker Cab’s motion: 
lack of likely success on the merits.  See Ferring Pharm., Inc. v. Watson Pharm., Inc., 
765 F.3d 205, 210 (3d Cir. 2014) (“The failure to establish any element . . . renders a 
preliminary injunction inappropriate.”  (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). 
